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Dreher: Agency

AGENCY
JAMES F. DREHER*

Of the cases decided by the Supreme Court, during the review period, that can be considered as coming traditionally
within the topic of Agency, only one, that of Johnson v. Win&kI.m,' deals with the power of an agent to bind his principal
and a third party contractually, rather than with the possible creation by a servant of a tort liability against his master. Such an outweighing of principal-agent cases by master-servant cases would seem to be the rule in present day
jurisprudence despite an opposite emphasis in Agency texts
and case books.
The Johnson case announces no new rule of law but does
illustrate a sound application of several basic Agency principles. The plaintiff sought specific performance of an alleged
written contract to convey real estate, his testimony being to
the effect that the defendant remainderman had bound himself and the defendant life tenant, his 74 year old mother,
to convey the property, and that a written contract had been
prepared and signed by the plaintiff and the remainderman
and left with the remainderman for him to procure the signature of the life tenant. The writing was not produced, but
the Court held that a contract sufficient to bind the remainderman had been established. Specific performance was refused,
however, because the interest of the life tenant had not been
legally bound by any act of her son. The son admittedly had
no express authority from his mother to contract for the
conveyance of her life estate, and the plaintiff pitched his
case largely upon the claim of an authority implied from the
fact that the son had handled similar transactions for her
in the past, and that he received from the plaintiff and turned
over to his mother the monthly payments called for by the
contract. As to the claimed prior transactions, the Court
found that the proof was entirely inadequate, and also found
"no merit" in the plaintiff's "contention that an agency to
*Member of the firm of Robinson, Robinson & Dreher, Columbia;
A.B., 1931, The Citadel; LL.B., 1934, University of South Carolina;
part time instructor, University of South Carolina, School of Law, 1946
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1. 224 S.C. 502, 80 S.E. 2d 234 (1954).
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collect money derived from the rental of a house implies the
power to sell and convey the principal's real estate from which
such money is derived." No ratification was shown by the
mother's receipt of the monthly payments because there was
no knowledge on her part that the payments were received
under a contract of sale rather than as rent. The plaintiff
made no claim as to apparent authority but such a claim would
have been unavailing under the facts because the plaintiff, by
admitting that the contract had been left with the son for the
mother's signature, admitted that he had not relied upon any
apparent authority in the son to sign for the mother.
The first of the respondeat superior cases decided during
the review period involved the familiar "loaned servant" doctrine. The case is Brabham v. Southern Asphalt Haulers Inc.,
et al.,2 in which the tractor-trailer which had injured the
plaintiff was owned by the named defendant but leased at
the time of the accident to the co-defendant, Infinger Transportation Co., Inc. The Infinger Company appealed from a
verdict against it alone upon the contention that the driver
of the tractor was the employee of the Southern Asphalt Company and subject to its control. The hauling was being done
under a contract obtained by Infinger from the Standard Oil
Company and the services of the driver as well as the vehicle
were leased by Southern Asphalt to Infinger with Infinger responsible for paying the driver's wages and allied charges.
Most important of all, the hauling was being done under an
Interstate Commerce Commission certificate held by Infinger.
Southern Asphalt had no such certificate and, therefore, no
legal right to accomplish the transportation. In affirming the
judgment below, the Court found it necessary to do little more
than to apply to the facts before it the legal principles announced in 1939 in Brownlee v. Charleston Motor Express
Company,3 a case in which another lessee of heavy transportation equipment operating under a South Carolina Public Service Commission license had been held liable against a contention that only the lessor, who owned the vehicle and was the
general employer of the driver, could be held. The Court in
the present case, as it had in the Brownlee case, points out that
the lessee had the full right to control the driver's acts and
that this is the controlling test in all cases involving the loan
or lease of vehicles with drivers. Whichever employer has the
2. 223 S.C. 421, 76 S.E. 2d 301 (1953).
3. 189 S.C. 204, 200 S.E. 819 (1938).
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right of control, whether the general employer or the special,
is the responsible master.
Although the soundness of the Brownlee and Brabham decisions can hardly be questioned, a simpler ground of decision
might have been available to the Court in both. Under the
quasi-monopoly which had been granted Infinger by the I. C.
C., upon a showing of the company's ability to perform and
to protect the travelling public, could not it be said that Infinger had a "non-delegable duty" to see that all transportation accomplished under the I. C. C. certificate was accomplished safely? In such cases as Engeiberg v. Prettyman,4
the South Carolina Court has held railroad companies responsible for the injuries arising from the operation of their equipment by lessees on the theory that the railroad companies had
no right to free themselves from liability by delegating their
common carrier duties to third parties. The same doctrine
should be applicable to motor carriers licensed for particular
operations by the proper Federal or State regulatory agencies. The South Carolina Court in the Brabham case does cite
cases, such as the North Carolina case of Jocie Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Johnson,5 decided wholly upon this ground.
, The fact that the case of McJunkin v. Waldrep6 decides a
point never before passed on in this State was occasioned by
the resourcefulness of defendant's counsel in attempting to
apply the doctrine of joint enterprise between the parties to
the enterprise. The plaintiff and two other beauty operator
employees of the defendant were traveling in the defendant's
automobile from Greenville to New York for the purpose of
taking special beautician training when a collision occurred
in Virginia, injuring the plaintiff. The defendant's defense
of joint enterprise, founded factually upon the general purpose and financial arrangements of the trip, was allowed to
go to the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant.
The Supreme Court reversed, relying upon 38 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, NEGLIGENCE, § 238, to the effect that the doctrine of joint enterprise "does not apply in actions between
members of the joint enterprise and does not, therefore, prevent one member of the enterprise from holding another liable
for personal injuries inflicted by the latter's negligence in the
prosecution of the enterprise."
4. 159 S.C. 91, 156 S.E. 173 (1930).

5. 231 N.C. 367, 57 S.E. 2d 388 (1950).
6. 81 S.E. 2d 284 (S.C. 1954).
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Still on the subject of joint enterprise, the Court's decision

in Thompson v. S. C. Highway Department,7 was merely a reminder that in the ordinary automobile accident case the question of whether the plaintiff and the driver of the car were
engaged in a joint enterprise is for the jury.
The final case to be commented upon, Gillespie v. Ford,8
contains easily the most elaborate discussion of Agency law,
by both the majority and the dissenting judges, of all the cases
cited. Actually, however, the holding is a narrow one. It is
simply that under certain circumstances an industrial life insurance agent may, as a servant, subject his company to respondeat superiorliability for his traffic torts.
The insurance agent in the Gillespie case was in charge of
a "debit" of such a size that the use of an automobile was necessary. His duties to his employer involved the collection of
weekly premiums from each policy holder in the debit and the
general servicing of the insurance. These facts and others
more or less peculiar to the employment of this individual
agent led the majority of the Court, which consisted of Justices Stukes and Oxner and Acting Associate Justice Greneker,
to conclude that the insurance company had the right at the
time of collision to control the physical conduct of the agent.
The dissenting members of the Court, Justice Taylor and Chief
Justice Baker, found from the facts that no such right of
control existed. The opinions of Mr. Justice Stukes for the
majority and Mr. Justice Taylor for the minority both recognized that this right of control is the factor which distinguishes the status of a servant from that of an agent who is
not a servant and whose physical torts will therefore not subject his employer to respondeatsuperiorliability. The Justices
seem to differ, therefore, not as to the applicable rule of law
but as to the factual aspects of the particular agency before
the Court.
The Gillespie decision was foreshadowed to some extent by
the 1946 decision of Carter's Dependents v. Palmetto State
Life Ins. Co., in which an agent of the industrial insurance
company defendant was held to be an employee of the company within the terms of the Workman's Compensation Act.
The Carter case did not control the respondeat superior question because Workman's Compensation laws are always lib7. 224 S.C. 338, 79 S.E. 2d 160 (1953).
8. 81 S.E. 2d 44 (S.C. 1954).
9. 209 S.C. 67, 38 S.E. 2d 905 (1946).
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erally construed in order to give as broad a coverage as possible, but Mr. Justice Stukes' opinion in the Gillespie case
cites the Cartercase against the insurance company's contention that the agent was an independent contractor. Although
a large part of the discussion of the Justices is in terms of
"independent contractor" versus "servant", technically the
question seems to be whether the insurance salesman is a servant or "an agent who is not a servant" within the meaning
of Section 250 of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENcY.
See the annotation in 116 A. L. R. 1389.
The opinions in the Gillespie case cite and discuss many of
the earlier landmark Agency decisions in this state and it is
evident that a great amount of research went into both.
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